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Introduction 
 
Why should Social Workers think about Philosophy, and why 
should Philosophers Care? 
 
 
 
Thinking at the Intersections 
For some, the intersection between philosophy and social work needs little justification. As 
Mel Gray and Stephen Webb write, ‘to “think social work” is to engage with and against 
contemporary and past theorists and theoretical concepts,’ which will almost inevitably 
involve crossing philosophical paths. Such crossing of paths is fundamental, as ‘the ‘joy of 
“thinking social work” is in creating alternative modes of understanding through critical 
engagement with competing perspectives.’ (Gray and Webb 2013: 7) Likewise, Gianni 
Vattimo and Santiago Zabala argue that ‘philosophy is not a disengaged, contemplative, or 
neutral reception of objects but rather the practice of an interested, projected, and active 
possibility.’ (2011: 14) 
 
However, a common reaction to the idea of ‘doing philosophy’ on a social work course is a 
combative one: from the dismissive ‘what’s that got to do with social work?’ to the hostile 
‘social work is about practice, not idealistic theories brought out from ivory towers!’, and a 
whole range in between. While it is true these may only reflect clichés of what both social 
work and philosophy actually are, it is equally true that clichés emerge through the frequency 
and repetition of their use, and nowhere is this more evident than the crude caricatures of 
‘theory’ and ‘practice’ that have often dominated social work as a discipline. What Chris 
Jones has termed the ‘anti-intellectual tradition’ in social work has by now been both well-
documented and well-criticised. Indeed, the space for in-depth ‘theoretical’ discussion within 
pre-registration social work programmes has often been limited by the perception that it 
competes with the ‘practical’ skills-based work of qualificatory education; a perception often 
shared not only between students but between government policy-makers (see Garrett 2013: 
214). While social work practice only ever takes place within some kind theoretical 
framework, whether acknowledged or not (Coulshed and Orme 2006), social workers can 
nevertheless ‘turn cold’ at the introduction of what they view as ‘esoteric, abstract, and 
something people discuss in universities’ (Mullaly 1997: 99). Jones notes the ‘specific and 
utilitarian manner’ in which mainstream social work has approached social research in the 
United Kingdom: ‘theories, perspectives, insights and research findings are plundered’, but 
rarely ‘in a spirit of genuine intellectual inquiry or exploration’ (Jones 1996: 194). Despite 
the development of first, social work’s Bachelor’s and Master’s degree qualifications, there 
remains in many areas an affirmation of the a-theoretical as a mark of professional virtue 
(Mullaly 1997: 100). The effectiveness of the theory/practice cliché is testified to by the fact 
that exactly this kind of opening paragraph can be seen in the introductions to almost every 
available book on social work theory.   
 
Of course, such provisos are given in order to be contested. In Gray and Webb’s words, 
‘social work practice is the bearer and articulation of more or less theory-laden beliefs and 
concepts. Even those who… [claim] that social work is just “good common sense” are, in 
fact, articulating a distilled version of philosophical theories about common sense.’ (Gray and 
Webb 2013: 5) Research has often shown that social workers rarely use ‘theory’ in formal or 
explicit ways (see Fook 2000). They can often utilise theories without identifying or naming 
them (Howe 1987), but nevertheless draw meaningful sense from complex situations. In this 
way social workers are always theorising in some shape or form. Indeed, relatively 
straightforward activities such as interpreting communicative cues, identifying individual 
agency, assessing actions and promoting freedoms, can only be carried out on the basis of 
fundamental philosophical commitments regarding how meaning is created, what a self is, 
why agency is important, the nature of the ‘good’, and so on.  
 
If this is the case with social work’s view of philosophy, then what about the return match – 
why don’t philosophers talk about social work? There are a range of answers to this, and, just 
as before, we must be careful not to fall prey to glib generalisations or stereotypes regarding 
the purpose of the discipline. After all, as Josef Niźnik has noted, the idea that philosophy is 
somehow intrinsically divorced from questions of social need, marginalisation or power is 
not borne out by its history:  
 
Reflection on the social context of human life appeared together with the 
human capacity to think about oneself, a capacity marking the beginnings of 
philosophy. The problems of the social conditions of man, and of institutions 
such as the state or of such values as justice, occupied a place in the repertoire 
of problems dealt with by the first philosophers as important as that of 
ontological or cosmological questions. (Niźnik 2006: 90) 
 
The applied social sciences do not hold exclusive rights to concerns for the social world. 
Perhaps rather too often, this is obscured by the relationship between philosophy and the 
social sciences being figured as somewhat hierarchical – philosophy handles the ‘big’ ideas, 
while social sciences deal with the individual cases that make up the big ideas – rather than a 
two-way conversation between concepts and their application (see Grimwood and Miller 
2014). Of course, in order to provide an encompassing philosophical argument regarding the 
world of human interaction, some level of abstraction seems necessary to render the argument 
meaningful: not because of the demands of any formal argumentation, but rather as an 
important (and pragmatic) link between particular cases and their more general application. 
As early as the late 2nd century CE, Hermagoras of Temnos (Lanham 1991: 150) identified 
this as the difference between a hypothesis and a thesis:  specific or empirical events (the 
hypotheses) are rendered meaningful within an overarching framework (the thesis). Thus, 
despite the visible prominence of its younger ‘rivals’ such as sociology and psychology 
within social work curricula, philosophy nevertheless continues to underpin their theories and 
ground their methods. As Niźnik comments, there is no need to see philosophical concerns as 
substitutes or antagonists of sociological or psychological ones. They not only display ‘the 
variety of methodological concepts, languages and doctrines familiar from philosophy, but 
[…] [t]hey are also close to one another in so far as they respond to the human need for 
understanding’ (2006: 89-90)  
 
 
But aren’t they different types of reasoning? 
Nevertheless, there may well be a philosophical objection to bridging the two disciplines, 
which is worth considering at this point. A version of this objection can be found in the 
influential essay by Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: “What is 
Enlightenment?”’, written in 1784. Here, Kant laid out what can be seen as an effective 
manifesto for modern philosophy, based on the principles of enlightenment. This involves, it 
could be argued, a separation of philosophical thinking from what can be interpreted as 
practice-based thinking. ‘Enlightenment’ Kant begins, ‘is man’s emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the 
guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, 
but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another.’ (Kant 1996: 11) 
We need to think for ourselves, and not on the unquestioned basis of what others tell us (be 
they lecturers, practice educators, government policies or whatever), or on the basis of ‘just 
what’s done around here.’  
 
But this obviously does not mean we do as we please; as that could hardly count as 
intellectual maturity. In pursuing our newly-found maturity, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the application of reasoning that is ‘courageous’, and reasoning that simply lets us 
get on with our lives. Thus, for Kant, we exercise a private reason when doing our jobs 
during the day, and a public reason in our reflective time after the shift is through. We may, 
Kant suggests, work in a tax office during the day, and utilise a certain rational way of 
thinking in order to do the job well (ordering the files, employing mathematical models, etc.). 
But our philosophical reasoning emerges when we go home at night, and write letters to the 
newspapers arguing how unfair the tax system as a whole was. Nearly 250 years after Kant 
put forward this argument, it would still not be an unfamiliar picture to imagine social 
workers conducting their assessments and interventions for social services departments 
during the day, but questioning after hours whether they were empowering individuals or 
merely acting as agents of the state. Jobs, according to Kant, require private reasoning 
because such thinking only extends as far as helping us as individuals play out our 
occupational role – to be, in Kant’s words, ‘a cog in a machine’. While such instrumental 
reasoning may still come under the remit of philosophy (there are good and bad ways to do a 
job, after all), this is ultimately secondary to the consideration of the ends which instrumental 
reasoning aims at. Hence, public reasoning requires us to think beyond our own individual 
circumstance and consider society, and the world, as a whole. It asks about the role and 
purpose of the job in the wider scheme of things. When we do this, we are reasoning as a 
rational being, rather than a cog in a machine: ‘when one is reasoning as a member of 
reasonable humanity, then the use of reason must be free and public.’ (Foucault 1984: 37) To 
be fully ‘public’, of course, the concern of reason for the reason’s sake must be universal 
rather than contextual. Hence, for Kant, philosophers might be interested in discussing 
questions such as whether we should always obey the law, even if that law conflicts with our 
values; whereas, for social workers, there are rather more pressing requirements to follow 
legal procedures determined by the context of their jobs. Public reason is necessary for 
society to reach enlightened ‘maturity’, whilst private reason is essential for there to be a 
society in the first place. And if the two are distinct, then it seems only natural for social 
workers to flip the argument around and ask: ‘how does thinking about concepts and causes 
really help me to do my job in the here and now?’ 
 
This separation between the kind of thinking that enables us to do a predefined job, with a 
clear set of aims and objectives, and the kind of thinking that is more typically seen as 
‘philosophical’, could be said to have informed a distinction within the work of philosophy 
itself. Textbooks on philosophical ethics will frequently point out that while professions rely 
on ethical codes, these are not really the subject of philosophy: they are, instead, simply rules 
to follow. For example, Alex Barber suggests that courses on vocational ethics ‘sometimes 
contain elements of moral philosophy’, but more commonly ‘they aim merely at presenting a 
list of professional protocols, i.e. rules for proper conduct in the relevant domain.’ (2010: 8) 
Or in Andrew Alexandra and Seumas Miller’s philosophical discussion of professional 
ethics: ‘That professionals have a range of special duties (and rights) seems undeniable […]. 
The question we address here is: “Where do these duties come from?”’ (2009: 104) The 
difference between the two seems to stem both from the manner in which they are learned – 
philosophical ethics are, generally speaking, more ‘up for discussion’ in the classroom than 
professional ethics, at least at most levels – and a broader debate within the history of 
philosophy, of which Kant’s argument was one decisive contributor: the debate over the 
kinds of thinking we do, and the relationship between these kinds of thinking and the 
distinctive activities that comprise different realms of human existence – work, play, family, 
etc.  
 
This distinction, however, has long been debated within social work itself. Social Work 
education as a whole sits within such a contested dialectical relationship between ‘field 
education’ or ‘practice placements’ and classroom-based questioning, analysis and reflection; 
or, between ‘training’ for the technical, day to day aspects of the job, and ‘education’ for a 
broader understanding of the potentially transformative role of the social worker within 
society. Donald Schön famously critiqued the notion of practice as a form of ‘technical 
rationality’ where ‘practitioners are instrumental problem solvers, who select technical means 
best suited to particular purposes’ (1987: 3); Neil Thompson has frequently advocated a 
‘dialectical relationship’ between theory and practice (2010: 15). Hence, it is important to 
question Kant’s distinction itself on several grounds, which in turn help to articulate how the 
relationship between the disciplines of social work and philosophy should be considered. 
 
Challenging Dichotomies, Clarifying Relationships 
First, it is important to remember that Kant’s argument is brief: a manifesto, in a sense, of the 
kind of thinking he associated with the prospective new age of Enlightenment. Instrumental 
reason might be utilised in order to get the job done, but this is all premised on the right job 
being done, which accorded to the principles of Enlightenment itself. In this sense, 
instrumental reason is not opposed to speculative thinking. Kant himself famously argued 
that ‘thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.’ (Kant 1993: 
69). There is, in fact, a clear lineage between the kind of moral society envisaged by Kant 
that was, via the work of Fichte, subsequently applied to social contexts in the work of British 
philosopher T.H. Green, and the work of the early forms of social work practice – most 
notably, the Charity Organisation Society and the Settlement House Movement in the United 
Kingdom and the United States – who were heavily influenced by these ideas (see Pierson 
2011; Lewis 1995; Simon 1994).  
 
Second, if this underpinning of the early forms of social work has since dissipated, the ‘work’ 
of social work must nevertheless be conceived broadly: ‘Not only is it either micro-level, 
individually oriented and confined to small-scale personal change, nor is it only about macro-
level, social structural change,’ Hugman writes. ‘It is about both of these things, sometimes 
separately and sometimes together. In short, social work is about the personal and the 
political.’ (Hugman 2013: 159, my emphasis) This suggests that the practicalities of social 
work go beyond instrumental reason alone. This has been clear since at least Plant’s 1970 
work Social and Moral Theory in Casework, which was one of the first texts to explore the 
philosophical depth of the day-to-day tasks of social work. And since Plant’s work, the idea 
of there even being a unified ‘method’ of social work has fragmented amongst a complex 
history of antagonistic relationships between competing models, approaches, directives and 
organisation. Consequently, the very question of where to draw the line between instrumental 
and normative reasoning is itself a philosophical discussion that social work is inherently part 
of; consider, for example, debates such as the criticisms of task-centred practice as 
prioritising an individualist sense of ‘getting the job done’, over and above broader issues of 
social and economic relationships (see Dominelli 1996). It is the practice of philosophy, I 
think, to track the modes of thought which link these otherwise separate areas together – 
personal and political, individual and social, and so on – and to unpack the conditions of such 
connections and disconnections that lie within them.  
 
This is why to simply perceive philosophy as something distinct and other-worldly from the 
day-to-day practical tasks of social work is a mistake. In part, this is because the time and 
space available for bringing to the fore of our everyday activities their philosophical content 
is often limited to distinct and separate spaces, and often such a space is, indeed, as ‘other-
worldly’ as a University classroom or quiet supervision behind closed doors. The space 
where we articulate the philosophical dimension of social work is often not the space where 
it actually happens. True, much philosophy may appear to be abstract and therefore difficult, 
initially, to relate to the day to day tasks of practice. But this does not separate the impact 
they have on each other. I agree, then, with Robert Imre’s point that ‘it is not necessarily the 
case that philosophy […] needs to be “practical” in showing [social workers] where public 
policy, or public discourse, or even a guide to individual life, is meant to turn.’ (Imre 2010: 
254) As Law and Urry once commented, to ‘change our understanding is to change the 
world, in small and sometimes major ways.’ (2004: 391) 
 
Thirdly, from the off, we need to be cautious about seeing philosophy in social work as 
simply a form of ethics – even if this is the most obvious area where the two disciplines speak 
to one another (and, indeed, why many interactions between the two take place within an 
ethical dialogue – see, for example, Plant (1970); Alexandra and Miller (2009)). We should 
likewise be wary of positioning philosophy within the same explanatory place of ‘social 
theory’ within social work, even if it can and does apply to that area. Our wariness is in part 
because the tendency for theory in social work to be considered as a purely functional 
exercise – that is, to ‘make sense’ of things in order to help things work, without challenging 
what making sense might mean, who outcomes work for, etc. – is problematic. This is 
because very activity involves some kind of philosophical current; and hence why the likes of 
Amy Rossiter have argued that an understanding of the ontology of social work needs to take 
precedence over and above its ethics (Rossiter 2011). To subsume theory into practice is, 
ironically, to already posit a specific metaphysics of social work: that is, a structuring order 
that precedes our experience of the world. Hence, when a social work theorist argues that ‘all 
this debate is fine, but is it useful for practice?’, the philosophical response would typically 
be: ‘that’s fine. But on what conditions are we defining “useful”?’ And while that kind of 
question can obviously be quite irritating if asked in the wrong context, or asked as an overly-
vague rhetorical question, there are clearly contexts within social work where it is entirely 
appropriate to be asking them, and to be demanding articulate answers.  
 
Fourthly, in turn, we need to resist the idea that social work speaks back to philosophy 
because of some privileged empirical experiences that can only be understood from a 
practitioner’s perspective. This attitude – what we might call a celebration of immanence – is 
at best facile. Instead, I would argue that social work intersects with philosophical concerns 
because of the different sites of tension that it lives (Price and Simpson 2007; Parton 1994). 
The International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW), for example, lists four key tensions 
embedded within the idea of social work itself, all of which point to philosophical problems:1 
 
1) Social workers are often asked to act from within the middle of conflicting interests, 
interests which they may well be equally invested and ‘loyal’ to. The dignity of an 
individual, the welfare of a child, the wellbeing of a community and the integrity of 
the profession may all compete for primacy in the outcome of an intervention. These 
have continuously raised questions for social work and philosophy alike as to the 
basis on which we frame and understand concepts such as the self, the community, 
individual dignity and so on. 
 
2) There often exists a conflict between the duty of social workers to ‘protect the 
interests of the people with whom they work,’ and broader social and political 
demands for ‘efficiency and utility.’ Both demands are grounded on important 
philosophical arguments regarding the rationalisation of action, and what constitutes 
our interests and relations in a globalised world. This requires articulating the bonds 
between people – culturally, ethically, politically, or communicatively – beyond the 
domain of behavioural or psychosocial descriptions. 
 
3) Social workers function as both ‘helpers and controllers’. But the distinction between 
‘helping’ and ‘controlling’ is far from obvious. Making a best interest assessment on a 
service user with learning difficulties may well be helpful, even if it appears to be an 
act of control; conversely, strategies for empowerment can easily risk stereotyping or 
tokenism, and thus over-determining service user identity. The old adage that social 
workers must choose between being ‘agents of the state’ or ‘agents of change is’, 
thankfully, losing currency; the dichotomy is false, as both simply beg the question as 
to what kind/s of power a social worker could be said to have. How, for example, do 
the machinations of their practice – the material culture of social work, it’s 
documentation practices and it’s textuality – shape the world they practice within? To 
what extent are the means by which they assess or diagnose a situation – that is, their 
interpretative practices – constituted within competing senses or requirements of what 
‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’ are? 
 
4) At every level, social workers face the problems created by the limitations on their 
resources. In this sense, they face the same tensions of all front-line services working 
with those who are in some sense excluded or marginalised from ‘normal’ society. 
The problem of resources is not simply one of economics, however: it is also a 
question of how to balance the ideal with the possible, and the normative (what 
should happen) from the descriptive (what is happening).  
 
Such tensions derive from both the conflicts within work on the ‘ground level’ itself 
(Galambos 2009), and the wider identity and role of social work within welfare provision, 
and within the formation of ‘the social’ itself (O’Brien 2004). The nature of these tensions, 
often situated as ambiguous and contested ‘interfaces’ between individual and social, 
marginalised and mainstream (Smith 2010), themselves challenge Kant’s distinction between 
‘private’ and ‘public’ reasoning. As Rossiter once reflected, the place of social work in late 
capitalist societies is one of doubt and insecurity, framed in a discourse of hope and 
innocence. From such a place, public and private roles, norms and actions are often blurred in 
moments of decision, and ‘there is no theory that can shield us from the complexity of [for 
example] the gesture of a white middle class woman giving an alcoholic Native homeless 
man a bowl of soup.’ (Rossiter 2001) Hartman argues that it is the ‘attention to person and 
situation and our refusal to retreat from mounting social problems by redefining them as 
personal defects, that creates the special character of social work’; but, significantly: ‘such a 
position creates both dilemmas and opportunities.’ (1989: 388) If, as McLaughlin (2012: 11-
12) suggests, there is a distinction between a social work researcher and a non-social work 
researcher, then it is this – rather than any privileged access to deprivation and 
marginalisation – that constitutes the ‘difference that is different’ which Gray and Webb 
claim differentiates social work ‘from other ways of thinking, such as those found in 
psychology, sociology, history or philosophy.’ (2013: 2) It is this that makes the intersection 
of social work and philosophy so interesting and productive for both perspectives. 
 
 
Philosophy and Interpretation: The Strategy of the Book 
It should be clear, then, that social work and philosophy do intersect in their interests and 
concerns, and both have something to say to each other. At the same time, it should equally 
be clear that this book is not attempting to provide immediate ‘fix it’ solutions in either field, 
or any kind of mapping exercises from philosophical theory to social work practice (as we 
could perhaps say that Blaug (1995) does with his reading of Habermas, or Thompson (1992) 
with Sartre). It should go without saying that this is not a book about how philosophy, in all 
of its wisdom, can bestow hitherto unreachable knowledge to the world of social work; 
Jacques Ranciere has rightly warned against the ‘pious vision in which philosophy comes to 
the rescue of the practitioner, […] explaining the reason for his quandary by shedding light 
on the principle of his practice.’ (Ranciere 1999: ix) ‘Philosophy,’ he quips, ‘does not come 
to anyone’s rescue and no one asks it to’. Neither, of course, is it a book where social workers 
firmly put philosophers in their place, by showing them what the ‘real world’ looks like. This 
is not a book about the philosophy of social work, nor does not intend to simply unpack the 
philosophical basis of the theories, models and approaches specific to social work as a 
discipline.  
 
For this reason, early on in the project I took the decision to not include any ‘case studies’ 
that are conventionally found in social work literature. The result would only be to slot 
philosophy into an already-crowded space of psychosocial theories that offer more direct 
‘solutions’ to social work contexts (not to mention some of the risks and problems associated 
with the use of ‘invented examples’ for both fields; see Grimwood and Miller, forthcoming). 
The project is in fact far more modest than its title may suggest: it seeks to lay out some areas 
of intersection where the two disciplines may mutually inform one another. My strategy is 
thus – to somewhat grossly paraphrase The Invisible Committee –not one of contamination, 
but of resonance. It effectively involves reading perspectives from philosophy and from 
social work research side by side, and suggesting ways in which the two resonate with each 
other: sometimes in harmony, sometimes more jarringly.  
 
On this note, it is worth emphasising that the book will not benefit from being read in 
isolation, and will likely appear abstract if done so. Philosophy as a practice works far better 
through questioning and critiquing than endless lists of references and examples. For this 
reason, I have pointed to specific areas where these debates may resonate in particular, but I 
have tried not to re-tread certain sociological or psychological areas that are already well 
covered in social work literature. Instead, I have included several points throughout each 
chapter where the reader is asked to reflect on their own practice, in order to help clarify the 
kind of intersection being explored. My hope is that these strike a healthy balance between 
reflection and analysis, without over-prescribing these.  
 
One of the fundamental contentions of this book is that social work is not simply a practical 
activity, but a series of interrelated perspectives on the micro, meso and macro relationships 
that make up culture, politics and society. It is rooted in interpretative tasks, and this informs 
the definition of philosophy that I use, which echoes that of Gianni Vattimo:  
 
Defined as the ontology of actuality, philosophy is practiced as an 
interpretation of the epoch, a giving-form to widely felt sentiments about the 
meaning of being alive in a certain society and in a certain historical world. 
[…] The difference, though, lies in the “interpretation”: philosophy is not the 
expression of the age, it is interpretation, and although it does strive to be 
persuasive, it also acknowledges its own contingency, liberty, perilousness. 
(Vattimo 2004: 88) 
 
As such, I make no claim to offering some kind of final word, or holistic overview of either 
philosophy or social work. This is an unapologetically partial series of essays, reflecting the 
interpretative and contingent nature of the discipline. Each of the topics examined in these 
essays commands entire libraries of literature within both disciplines, and in filling in some 
gaps we will always be opening more. The fact that social work is, fundamentally, a 
relational practice means that any appeal to a ‘God’s eye view’, universal survey or impartial 
view of what the world is ‘really like’, detached from any meaningful location or perspective, 
is unhelpful in practical terms. Likewise, the unifying theme of philosophical and cultural 
hermeneutics is the interpretative relationships between people, concepts, and the material 
world around them; it focuses on how the meaning of our actions is articulated within these 
relationships, and what the cultural, political and social significance of them is. Graham Ward 
summaries this approach neatly: 
 
Ontological and epistemological categories are understood to emerge from and 
issue into various forms of action, wedding practical wisdom (phronesis) with 
the learned skill of handling language (techne) and habits of everyday life 
(praxis). The activity of interpretation is conducted alongside and with respect 
to other people and the many cultural forms that are the products of the 
interaction between people (institutions, tools, art-forms). […] Cultural 
hermeneutics is concerned with the concrete reality of others. (Ward 2005: 65) 
 
This ‘concrete reality’ is important for the hermeneutic approach. Recognising the 
importance of interpretation to the meanings that surround and define us does not lead to 
some kind of linguistic idealism – we cannot simply interpret out of thin air. Rather, concrete 
reality is always mediated: by the language we speak, the cultural images and metaphors that 
pervade it, the social structures within it, and so on. The limits of this mediation both shape 
the way we think, but also become a matter of thought itself (Taylor 1985). As a brief 
example, consider how difficult it is to challenge the kind of principle of social work 
education that Cain asserts: ‘[s]ocial work education is about more than just teaching new 
information and skills; it is also about encouraging students to question their assumptions and 
values and the structure of the world around them’ (1996: 65). But the very fact that few 
would challenge this – as Cain’s argument which then unfolds regarding the implicit 
heterosexism of social work education makes clear – means that further questions also need 
to be asked: from where would a student do this? Is it possible to question assumptions 
without resting on further assumptions? At what point do we stop? At what point can we stop 
questioning? Are there certain modes of thought which we cannot help but use when we think 
about certain areas of practice – regardless of whether these are ‘good’ or not? Without 
asking such questions, ‘critical thinking’ can become something of an over-determined and 
artificially linear path of therapeutic self-discovery – ‘I used to think this, but now I know 
that!’ – rather than an ongoing interpretative project. 
 
 
But how Practical is it?  
If philosophy is the practice of interpreting the meaning of human ideas and actions in order 
to facilitate both understanding and transformation, then in this sense, professionals working 
in social care, community work and social work all engage with philosophical ideas on a day-
to-day level, in what Lena Dominelli has characterised as the ‘change orientation’ within 
social work knowledge (2005: 230). This interpretative aspect underlies the approach of this 
book precisely because philosophy and social work share an essential relation whereby they 
are both, fundamentally, about thinking and acting both within and beyond culture. Within 
culture, because both are formed substantively by responding to the needs, calls and pressures 
of a contemporary socio-cultural context. They are shaped around a certain functional 
requirement. But both social work and philosophy are also beyond culture, to the extent that 
the contours of their practice are concerned with change and transformation. Responses to the 
present are made meaningful only through on a broader focus on the future. This is perhaps 
more readily seen in the radical and critical social work theorists, far more than the 
procession of ‘models’ and diagrammatic explanations of ‘how things are’ that can tend to 
dominate social work education. But even the most pragmatic and functionalist approaches 
carry implicit aspirations towards a certain type of society, and a certain direction it should 
take.  
 
The danger felt by some, of course, may be that there is such a thing as too much questioning, 
or too much reflection, and that this will inevitably come at the expense of something else. In 
this case, we must be careful to delineate between the neoliberal framing of higher education, 
which demands subject disciplines show their ‘market value’ and ‘economic impact’ in 
immediate and quantifiable terms, and the more political voices of social work theory that 
look for theory to make a recognisably political difference to the context of practice. The first 
sense of ‘being useful’ is problematic for both social work and philosophy. The second sense 
is part of a wider dialogue over the role of theory and socio-cultural transformation, which I 
hope this book contributes to, even if it is not a book devoted solely to politics and policy. 
The ‘practical’ task of the book, rather, is to consider whether what makes sense – either in 
theory or practice – actually does makes sense, rather than simply reproducing the readymade 
authority of clichés and platitudes; and it does by examining what the conditions of it making 
sense are.  
 Once, it was thought that an understanding on what lay beyond the immediacies of the world 
of practice was the best bulwark against social worker’s losing hope: as when MacIver 
claimed that the ‘social worker who has no background of social philosophy is at the mercy 
of a thousand discouragements.’ (MacIver, quoted in Marshall 1946: 17) Today, this view of 
philosophy as therapy may be less popular! But the need to think outside of the inevitability 
of the present remains just as pressing. And as previously mentioned, such thinking may be 
best done, not through the contamination of one discipline into the other, but rather through 
the resonance of arguments and ideas. 
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